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The migration of people between different cultures has affected cultural change throughout
history. To understand this process, cross-cultural psychologists have used the ‘acculturation’
framework, classifying ‘acculturation orientations’ along two dimensions: the willingness to
interact with culturally different individuals, and the inclination to retain the own cultural
identity (‘cultural conservatism’). Here, using a cultural evolution approach, we construct a
dynamically explicit model of acculturation. We show that the evolution of a multicultural
society, where immigrant and resident culture stably coexist, is more likely if individuals
readily engage in cross-cultural interactions, and if resident individuals are more culturally
conservative than immigrants. This result holds if some cultural traits pay off better than
others, and individuals use social learning to adopt more advantageous cultural traits. Our
study demonstrates that formal dynamic models can help us understand how individual
orientations towards immigration eventually determine the population-level distribution of
cultural traits.
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M igration between human populations can affect thecultural repertoire of both immigrant and resident(host) groups in a number of ways. In some cases,
immigrants adopt cultural variants that are present in the resident
population. For example, the diet of Mexican immigrants in the
United States is more similar to the diet of non-Hispanic white
Americans than it is to the diet of Mexicans1. Immigrant groups
can also inﬂuence the resident culture. For example, the
immigration of approximately 100,000 Chinese immigrants into
nineteenth-century Peru substantially inﬂuenced Peruvian cui-
sine. This is evidenced by the culinary tradition of ‘chifa’, which is
rooted in Chinese cuisine but incorporates Peruvian elements,
and by the general importance of rice as one of the main
carbohydrate staples in contemporary Peru2. Other outcomes are
also possible: immigrant and resident culture may mix to produce
new cultural variants such as Creole languages, or they may retain
much of the original culture and often hardly change over long
periods of time, as in ethnic enclaves such as Klein-Ankara in
Berlin or Chinatowns in the United States and United Kingdom3.
In the social sciences, cultural changes that take place as a
result of migration have traditionally been studied in the
framework of ‘acculturation’. Acculturation is deﬁned as 'those
phenomena which result when groups of individuals having
different cultures come into continuous ﬁrst-hand contact, with
subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or
both groups'4. Berry5 distinguishes four different acculturation
orientations, as resulting from two tendencies: the tendency to
maintain the own cultural identity and the tendency to establish
relations with the other cultural groups (Fig. 1). Henceforth, we
will refer to these dimensions as ‘degree of cultural conservatism’
and ‘interaction tendency’, respectively. To be clear, we use the
term ‘cultural conservatism’ in a strict sense, as the tendency to
conserve one’s culture (so not in the broader political sense that is
associated with the term ‘conservatism’). According to Berry5, a
high degree of cultural conservatism can either result in an
integration orientation (in case of high interaction tendency) or
in a separation orientation (in case of low interaction tendency),
while a low degree of cultural conservatism can result in an
assimilation orientation (in case of high interaction tendency) or
a marginalisation orientation (in case of low interaction
tendency).
Although Berry’s classiﬁcation is useful, its societal
implications are not immediately obvious, for at least two reasons.
First, acculturation orientations may differ between individuals in
both immigrant and resident groups, and may change over
time3,5,6. It is far from obvious how the acculturation process
might unfold in a population that is mixed and/or dynamic with
respect to acculturation orientations. Second, there may be mis-
matches in the orientations of the immigrant and resident groups;
for example, immigrants may prefer to integrate (maintaining
their cultural identity), whereas residents may prefer immigrants
to assimilate (adopting the resident culture3). The societal
outcome of the acculturation process in case of such mismatched
acculturation orientations is not straightforward to ascertain. For
example, it is not clear under which circumstances a multicultural
society, in which both immigrant and resident traits stably
coexist, is likely to emerge.
Given the dynamic and complex nature of the acculturation
process, it is likely that verbal reasoning alone is insufﬁcient to
fully appreciate the societal implications of migration on cultural
change. The construction of a formal model requires the identi-
ﬁcation of the important parts of the system and the relationships
between them, and forces the scholar to explicitly consider the
assumptions that have to be made when developing theory. This
facilitates the development of a sharper intuition about the
system, and helps avoid mistakes that are easily made when
reasoning verbally about complex dynamic systems (see ref. 7
about the beneﬁts of using formal models in the behavioural
sciences). Hence, a theoretical modelling approach is needed to
aid our understanding. In this study, we develop a model to
investigate the dynamics of cultural change that result from
migration, depending on the acculturation orientations that are
present in the society. To do this, we make use of ideas and
techniques from the ﬁeld of cultural evolution, where there is a
signiﬁcant tradition of studying cultural change using formal
methods.
The study of cultural evolution is based on the idea that cul-
tural change is, to a certain extent, a process analogous to genetic
evolution8–12. Cultural change can be considered as a type of
adaptive evolution, because it meets the three basic requirements
of evolution by natural selection13: variation (cultural traits differ
between individuals), differential persistence (some cultural traits
may spread more readily than others) and inheritance (cultural
traits are transmitted between individuals through forms of social
learning). There have been some investigations into the role of
migration in the process of cultural evolution9,14–16, but the effect
of acculturation orientations on cultural change has not yet been
investigated within this framework.
As social learning is the mode of cultural transmission, the
ways in which individuals learn from each other have received
much attention in the ﬁeld of cultural evolution17. It has been
shown that individuals use various social learning strategies,
including ‘frequency-based learning’, where the probability of
acquiring a cultural trait depends on the frequency of that trait in
the population (e.g., conformism), and ‘success-based learning’
where individuals preferentially adopt traits from successful
individuals18,19. The social learning strategies people use may
differ between individuals19 and between cultures20, and these
differences can have substantial ramiﬁcations for the outcome of
social interactions21. To come to a full appreciation of how
cultural traits may change in a population with migration, social
learning strategies must be part of the equation.
We present a simple model to systematically assess how
acculturation orientations and social learning strategies affect
cultural change in populations with continuous immigration.
We consider a resident population with a constant inﬂux of
immigrants, and assume that these two types originally differ in
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Fig. 1 Berry’s classiﬁcation of acculturation orientations5. The four
acculturation orientations result from the two dimensions shown on the
axes: how much importance individuals give to maintaining their own
cultural identity (‘degree of cultural conservatism’, horizontal axis) and how
much importance they give to establishing interactions with other cultures
(‘interaction tendency’, vertical axis). The four individual orientations can
be interpreted as corresponding to possible outcomes of the acculturation
process: immigrants are either participating members of the host society
that have kept their cultural identity (integration), participating members of
the host society that have adopted the host culture (assimilation), socially
segregated members of society that have kept their cultural identity
(separation), or socially segregated members of society that have not kept
their own culture (marginalisation)
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the cultural traits they express. Over time, individuals’ cultural
traits may change through interactions with others in the popu-
lation, depending on their acculturation orientations. Their
interaction tendency determines how likely they are to interact
with individuals from the other cultural group, and their degree
of cultural conservatism determines how likely they are to change
their cultural trait as a result of such interactions. We investigate
how the outcome of the model depends on model parameters
such as migration rate and the acculturation orientations asso-
ciated with the resident and immigrant cultures.
We consider three versions of the model, which differ in the
assumptions they make on social learning. We start with a simple
baseline model, in which we consider two cultural traits (initially
associated with residents and immigrants, respectively), that are
in principle completely arbitrary (i.e., they do not confer any
advantages or disadvantages to the individuals that express them).
For example, one might think of the different ways the same
ingredient (e.g., potato) is used in the cuisines of various cultures
(e.g., poutine in Canada, rösti in Switzerland or stamppot in the
Netherlands). In this version of the model, the probability that
individuals change their cultural traits is fully dependent on their
acculturation orientation (social learning strategies are absent in
this case). In the second version of the model, we consider cul-
tural traits that have some kind of functional relevance, con-
sidering cases where either the immigrant or the resident cultural
trait is more advantageous than the other (i.e., confers a payoff
advantage to the individual expressing it, such as the usage of
gunpowder weapons in warfare). With this model, we investigate
how success-based learning strategies affect the spread of cultural
traits. In the third version of the model, we study cases where the
payoffs of cultural traits are not constant, but depend on the
population constitution. Here, we consider both the case where
the most common trait has a payoff advantage (coordination, e.g.,
driving on the left or right side of the road, or salutations with a
handshake vs. a bow), and the case where the least common trait
is superior (complementation, e.g., practicing a rare trade and
therefore having less competition). Throughout, we track the
frequencies of the two cultural traits, and determine whether
cultural evolution leads to the ﬁxation of either of the traits, or
maintains a multicultural society in which both cultural traits
coexist.
We ﬁnd that both the interaction tendency and the degree of
cultural conservatism considerably affect the distribution of
resident and immigrant culture, across all scenarios we investi-
gated. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the stable coexistence of both
immigrant and resident culture in a single population (i.e., a
multicultural society) is more likely if individuals of both cultural
types are relatively willing to interact with each other, and if
resident culture is associated with stronger cultural conservatism
than immigrant culture. These general patterns hold both in the
presence and in the absence of payoff consequences associated
with both types of cultural traits. These results show that, at least
under the assumptions of our model, acculturation orientations
have a robust effect on the stability of multiculturalism.
Results
The model. We consider a ﬁnite population of N individuals,
which initially consists entirely of residents (see Table 1 for an
overview of all model parameters). There is a constant inﬂux of
immigrants, and residents and immigrants are initially dis-
tinguished by an observable cultural trait that can be subject to
change. We refer to individuals that carry the cultural trait
initially associated with the residents as ‘type R’, and individuals
that carry the cultural trait initially associated with the immi-
grants as ‘type I’ (all immigrants initially carry the same cultural
trait). An individual’s cultural trait may change through inter-
actions with other individuals. Whether this occurs depends on
the acculturation orientation of the individual, which is deter-
mined by the two orientational dimensions: the degree of cultural
conservatism and the interaction tendency (see Fig. 1).
The model is event based; in each time step, one individual (the
‘focal individual’) is drawn at random from the population (with
probability 1N). Next, the focal individual is either replaced by an
immigrant (an ‘immigration event’, occurring with probability
m), or else paired with a random other individual from the
population (an ‘interaction event’, occurring with probability 1-
m). Hence, m gives a measure of the probability of a migration
event relative to an interaction event (rather than denoting the
probability of a migration event happening per unit time; see
Supplementary Note 1 for a generalised model where the
probabilities of migration and interaction are modelled as
separate rates, leading to very similar results as the original
model). In case of an interaction event, it is not necessarily the
case that an interaction actually occurs—this depends on the
interaction probability X (which is a function of the interaction
tendencies of both individuals). If two individuals of different
cultural types actually interact, the focal individual changes its
cultural type with probability S (which is a function of its cultural
conservatism and social learning strategy). For detailed speciﬁca-
tions of the interactions probabilities and the probabilities of
changing cultural type, see the 'Methods' section. We implemen-
ted this model in two ways: (1) as a deterministic model, where
the change in type frequency is described by the following
Table 1 Model notations
Symbol Meaning
N Population size
m Migration rate (probability of migration event in each time step; interaction event occurs with complementary probability 1-m)
R Cultural trait initially associated with the resident
I Cultural trait initially associated with the immigrant
pi, pr Relative frequency of type I and R, respectively
xii, xrr Interaction tendency with the same type (of I and R, respectively)
xir, xri Interaction tendency with the other type (of I and R, respectively)
Xii, Xrr, Xir, Xri Interaction probability of two individuals
ci, cr Degree of cultural conservatism of type I and R
Δc= cr−ci Difference between the degree of cultural conservatism of type I and R
Si, Sr Probability to change one’s type in an interaction with the other type for type I and type R individuals, respectively
ΔS= Sr−Si Difference between the changing probability of type I and R
Wi, Wr Transmission advantage (‘payoff’) of trait I and R, respectively
ΔW Difference between the payoff of trait I and R
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differential equation:
dpi
dt
¼ 1
N
 m  1 pið Þ½
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
immigration
þ 1mð Þ  ð1 piÞ  pi  Xir  ΔSð Þ½ 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
interaction
ð1Þ
and (2) in an individual-based simulation that takes stochasticity
into account. The basic rationale behind equation is as follows. If
an immigration event takes place, the focal individual is replaced
by an immigrant individual of type I (so there is no change in pi if
the focal individual is of type I). Hence, immigration events
increase the frequency of the type I trait (pi) in the population at
the rate 1N m  1 pið Þ. If an interaction event occurs, the
cultural trait of the focal individual only changes (with probability
S) if it is paired with an individual of the other type (which occurs
with probability (1 − pi) pi) and an interaction actually takes place
(which happens with probability Xir). The net rate of change in pi
resulting from actual interactions is given by ΔS, which is
arrived at by subtracting the rate at which type I
individuals change to type R (given by Si) from the rate at which
type R individual change to type I (given by Sr). Hence, the overall
rate at which interaction events change pi is given by
1
N 1mð Þ  ½ð1 piÞ  pi  Xir  ΔSð Þ. For simplicity, we assume
that acculturation orientations are linked to cultural traits, so if
individuals change their cultural trait, they also change their
acculturation orientation (adopting the relevant values for
interaction tendencies and cultural conservatism).
To check whether there is general agreement between our
analytical model and the simulations, we compare the results of
both for the baseline version of the model (in which there are no
payoff differences between the cultural traits). For the two
versions of the model in which the cultural traits are not
equivalent in terms of payoffs, we only show results for our
analytical model (see 'Methods' section for a detailed speciﬁcation
of these scenarios and of the social learning strategies that
individuals are assumed to use in them).
No payoff differences. In the baseline version of the analytical
model, when the two cultural traits do not have any consequences
in terms of payoffs, we ﬁnd two equilibria (equating the right-
hand side of equation (1) to zero): one at pi ¼ 1 (where the
immigrant trait spreads to ﬁxation), and the other at:
pi ¼
m
1m 
1
Δc
 1
Xir
; ð2Þ
where both the resident and the immigrant traits coexist in the
population. In the latter (internal) equilibrium, pi is positively
related to m and negatively related to Δc and Xir. This makes
intuitive sense: a higher migration rate (i.e., a higher probability
of migration relative to the probability of interaction) will result
in a higher equilibrium frequency of the immigrant cultural trait
(pi ), whereas a relatively high cultural conservatism of type R
individuals (cr> ci, which means Δc> 0) will result in a lower
equilibrium frequency of the immigrant cultural trait. Also, with
increased interaction probability between both types (Xir), type I
individuals (that are initially rare and are therefore mostly paired
with type R individuals) are less likely to retain their cultural
traits, resulting in a lower equilibrium frequency of the immigrant
cultural trait. A graphical representation of equilibrium fre-
quencies is given in Fig. 2 (for both for the analytical model and
for the simulations).
The internal equilibrium exists and is stable only if:
m
1m<Δc  Xir: ð3Þ
This condition can only be satisﬁed if Δc> 0. In other words,
coexistence of both traits is only possible if individuals of type R
are more culturally conservative than individuals of type I. For
increasing migration rates, stable coexistence of both types
requires either a relatively higher cultural conservatism of the
resident type (i.e., a larger value of Δc), or a higher probability
that individuals from the different types interact (i.e., a larger
value of Xir). In line with this, the equilibrium frequency of type R
increases with an increase in either of these two quantities.
Constant payoff differences. When the cultural traits are asso-
ciated with payoff differences, we assume individuals will be more
likely to adopt the cultural trait of their interaction partner if it is
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Fig. 2 Equilibrium frequency of the type I trait in the baseline model. The equilibrium frequency of the trait that is initially associated with immigrants (type
I) in the baseline model, in relation to the migration rate (m) and the difference in cultural conservatism between both types (Δc= cr − ci). Left panel: low
interaction probability between individuals with different cultural traits (Xir= 0.1); right panel: relatively high interaction probability (Xir= 0.5). Lines depict
the equilibrium frequency of the type I trait in the analytical model. For parameter combinations below the solid line (pi ¼ 1:0), type R goes extinct. Above
the solid line, a stable polymorphism is reached, where the equilibrium frequency of type I is positively related to m and negatively related to Δc. Note that
we only consider migration rates above zero (m ranges between 0.001 and 0.1). Hence, since there is always a constant inﬂux of type I individuals, the type
I trait can reach very low values for low values of m, but can never go fully extinct for any of the parameter combinations. The heat map indicates the
results of individual-based simulations. Each coloured block shows the frequency of the immigrant trait after 106 events, averaged over 10 simulation runs.
Simulations and analytical predictions are in good agreement
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associated with a higher payoff than their own cultural trait.
Hence, changing probability S is now determined by both cultural
conservatism and the payoff difference between both traits (see
'Methods' section for details). In the scenarios of resident
advantage and immigrant advantage, the payoff difference (ΔW)
between both cultural traits is constant. Consequently, the dif-
ference between the changing probabilities of the two types (ΔS)
is also constant. In the analytical model, we ﬁnd two equilibria:
one at pi ¼ 1, as in the model without payoff consequences, and
the other at:
pi ¼ 
m
1m 
1
ΔS
 1
Xir
; ð4Þ
where both cultural traits coexist. This equilibrium exists and is
stable only if:
m
1m< ΔS  Xir: ð5Þ
ΔS depends both on the payoffs associated with the cultural traits
and on the cultural conservatism of the two types.
Figure 3 shows the equilibrium frequencies of the immigrant
trait in the analytical model both for the resident advantage
scenario (left panel) and the immigrant advantage scenario (right
panel). Notice that the parameters are chosen such that the
immigrant trait does not easily ﬁxate: the migration rate is low
(m = 0.01) and the resident trait is associated with a high cultural
conservatism (cr = 0.95). Yet, even under these conditions, the
immigrant trait can spread to ﬁxation in both the immigrant
advantage and resident advantage scenarios if the probability of
interaction between both types is very low (i.e., for low Xir). In
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Fig. 3 Equilibrium with constant payoff differences. The equilibrium frequency of trait that is initially associated with immigrants (type I) when it has a
payoff advantage (immigrant advantage, right) or a payoff disadvantage (resident advantage, left). Both lines and colours depict the equilibrium
frequencies of the immigrant trait as calculated using the analytical model. Solid lines show the boundary between the coexistence equilibrium and the
equilibrium where the type I trait becomes ﬁxed (pi ¼ 1). In both graphs cr= 0.95, W0= 1 and m= 0.01
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Fig. 4 Equilibrium structure for the scenarios of coordination and complementation. The payoff of a cultural trait increases with its perceived frequency for
the coordination scenario (a, b) and decreases for the complementation scenario (c, d). a, c individuals are equally likely to interact with both types (Xii=
Xrr= Xir= 1.0); b, d individuals are more likely to interact with individuals of the same type (Xir= 0.1; Xii= Xrr= 1.0). Lines indicate how the left-hand side
(red) and the right-hand side (black) of the equilibrium condition M=Ψ(pi). Equilibria are present when red and black lines cross; arrows depict the
stability of the equilibria (shown only for Δc= 0.5). In both scenarios, coexistence equilibria are more likely to exist if individuals from different types are
relatively likely to interact with each other (a, c), and when the resident type is relatively culturally conservative (solid lines)
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other words, even if the resident cultural trait is superior, it will be
lost from the population if immigrants and residents rarely
interact with each other.
Frequency-dependent payoff differences. In the scenarios of
coordination and complementation, payoffs depend on the per-
ceived frequencies of the resident and immigrant types in the
population. This leads to a substantial increase in the complexity
of the model, causing the equilibrium analysis of these scenarios
to be a tedious exercise. Therefore, we use a numerical approach
to identify equilibria. Again, we ﬁnd the equilibrium in which the
immigrant type is ﬁxed (pi ¼ 1), and we identify an internal
equilibrium at:
m
1m ¼ p

i  Xir  ΔS: ð6Þ
For illustrative purposes (see Fig. 4), we summarise each of the
sides of this equation into a single parameter, one of which
depends on only the migration rate and denotes the ratio of the
probability of a migration event to the probability of an inter-
action event:
M ¼ m
1m ð7Þ
and the other dependent on the other parameters, which include
acculturation orientation, social learning strategy and the popu-
lation constitution:
ΨðpiÞ ¼ pi  Xir  ΔS; ð8Þ
so that an internal equilibrium exists if
M ¼ ΨðpiÞ: ð9Þ
Internal equilibria can be realised for both the coordination and
complementation scenarios (Fig. 4). In the coordination scenario,
if all interaction probabilities are high (Xii = Xrr = Xir = 1.0), and
the migration rate is sufﬁciently low, we ﬁnd two internal equi-
libria (Fig. 4a), one of which is a stable coexistence equilibrium.
For higher migration rates, the internal equilibria disappear and
the type I trait spreads to ﬁxation. Furthermore, if the type I trait
confers a high cultural conservatism, it has a higher probability to
ﬁxate in the population. If the two types are relatively unlikely to
interact with each other (Xir = 0.1; Xii = Xrr = 1.0), the type R trait
needs to confer a higher cultural conservatism for both traits to
coexist in the population, even for low migration rates (Fig. 4b),
rendering it relatively likely that the type I trait spreads to ﬁxation
in this case.
In the complementation scenario, only a single internal
equilibrium can exist (Fig. 4c, d), in which case it is always a
stable coexistence equilibrium. Also here, stable coexistence is
much more likely to be realised if both types are likely to interact
with each other (Fig. 4c), than if they are not (Fig. 4d).
Discussion
In this study, we combined dynamic modelling tools derived from
evolutionary biology within the conceptual framework of accul-
turation from cross-cultural psychology to study how migration
affects cultural change. Adopting Berry’s classiﬁcation of accul-
turation orientations in a cultural evolution model, we studied
how cultural conservatism and the tendency to interact with
individuals from other cultures affect cultural change in a
population with continuous immigration. In addition, we con-
sidered a number of scenarios in which cultural traits have dif-
ferent payoff consequences, and investigated how acculturation
orientations and social learning strategies interact to produce
cultural change.
Our model generated a number of insights into how accul-
turation orientations can affect the establishment of immigrant
cultural traits in a resident population. As might be expected, the
cultural conservatism of both immigrants and residents (the
tendency to retain one’s cultural heritage) has a clear impact on
the establishment and spread of immigrant culture. Moreover, the
rate at which individuals expressing different cultural traits
interact plays a crucial role. If immigrants and residents do not
tend to interact much, the immigrants will not adopt the resident
culture, even if they are in principle willing to change, and/or if
the resident culture is associated with better payoffs.
Our model predicts that the emergence of a stable multicultural
society, in which both immigrant and resident cultural traits
coexist, is dependent on two main factors. First, the probability of
stable coexistence increases with the willingness of immigrants
and residents to interact with each other. Second, coexistence is
more likely when the immigrant cultural trait is associated with a
higher willingness to change than the cultural trait of the resident
(i.e., if residents are more culturally conservative). Interestingly,
these results hold regardless of the payoffs that are associated with
the different cultural traits. We predict that constant payoff dif-
ferences (resident advantage or immigrant advantage) are only of
importance if individuals of both cultures interact with a fre-
quency that is sufﬁciently high (and even then, they are far from
all-determining). When the payoffs of cultural traits increase with
their frequency (coordination) and in the opposite scenario where
payoffs decrease with frequency (complementation), many out-
comes are possible, but our overall conclusions regarding the
probability of the emergence of a multicultural society hold in
both these cases.
Using a cultural evolution approach to study acculturation
involves a conceptualisation of culture that diverges from how
culture is typically studied in cross-cultural psychology. Berry22
deﬁnes culture as 'a complex set of interrelated independent
variables' (‘independent’ meaning 'having an existence outside
any particular individual'). In contrast, within the cultural evo-
lution framework, culture is treated as a set of transmissible
characteristics that ultimately reside in individuals. Although
acculturation orientation is a concept that originates from cross-
cultural psychology, it is relatively straightforward to see how it
relates to the spread of culture between individuals. Our model
shows that the individual-centred approach from cultural evolu-
tion can be used to investigate the importance of such concepts
for the process of cultural change. Having said that, our model
highly simpliﬁes immigrant and resident culture to only two
discrete cultural traits. By doing this, we disregard the fact that
cultural traits are often interrelated, and embedded in a larger
cultural repertoire—phenomena that typically receive more
attention in the tradition of cross-cultural psychology. Hence,
although our model makes some ﬁrst steps towards integrating
both perspectives, there is still plenty of scope for progress in this
regard.
To be able to come to an insightful interpretation of model
outcomes, it is necessary to make simplifying assumptions. In this
study, we assumed that the population is well mixed (individuals
are equally likely to encounter any other individual in the
population), although we did allow for non-random interaction
probabilities as a result of individuals’ acculturation orientations.
This ‘mass action’ principle is a standard simplifying assumption
of many models in biology (e.g., epidemiological models), but it is
hardly a realistic reﬂection of actual interaction structures in
human societies. In reality, spatial conﬁguration and social net-
work structure strongly determine interaction structure23, and are
known to have a signiﬁcant impact on ecological and
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/s41467-017-02513-0
6 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |  (2018) 9:58 |DOI: 10.1038/s41467-017-02513-0 |www.nature.com/naturecommunications
evolutionary dynamics24, including cultural evolution (e.g. refs.
25,26). In our case, we might expect that spatial structure leads to
clustering of residents and migrants if the interaction prob-
abilities between both types are low (as in ethnic enclaves). Thus,
spatial structure may allow for the coexistence of both immigrant
and resident cultural traits across wider range of conditions.
There are models that explore interactions between different
cultures in a spatial context, such as Schelling’s segregation
model27 and models that look at the propagation of cultural traits
in space28. However, further work is needed to study how
migration may affect cultural change and the distribution of
cultural variants in explicitly spatially structured (or network-
structured) populations, when cultural change is a result of
acculturation and/or social learning.
In this study, we focus on differences between resident and
immigrant culture—we do not consider any individual differ-
ences in cultural traits or acculturation orientations within cul-
tural groups. As part of this approach, we have also assumed that
cultural trait and acculturation orientation are inextricably linked;
if individuals change their cultural trait, they also change their
acculturation orientation along with it. We have made these
choices to keep our model relatively simple and our results easily
interpretable, but this does not mean that we think individual
differences within cultures are not important to acculturation.
Although there are cultural traits that are indeed much more
variable between cultures than within them (e.g., using chopsticks
vs. western style utensils), within-culture individual differences
are certainly relevant with respect to various cultural traits (e.g.,
the extent to which people are religious). In addition, previous
work has shown that the outcome of the (individual) accultura-
tion process is signiﬁcantly affected by various individual-level
variables29. Indeed, we think that incorporating individual dif-
ferences in dynamically explicit models of acculturation would be
an interesting avenue of further research.
Our model assumes a ﬁxed population size and a constant
inﬂux of a single type of immigrants into the population. It is
important to note that these assumptions make it impossible for
the immigrant trait to go extinct, even if it is associated with a
relatively poor payoff or if immigrants are much less culturally
conservative than residents. Indeed, because of the incessant
immigration in our model, immigrant culture will always become
ﬁxed in the population unless counteracted by mechanisms such
as relatively high resident cultural conservatism or com-
plementarity of cultural traits. Especially when the probability
that immigrants and residents interact is low, the mechanisms
that counteract the spread of immigrant culture can easily be
overwhelmed by the spread of immigrant culture caused by the
immigration rate alone. In reality, populations may grow or
shrink, migration pressures ﬂuctuate over time and the cultural
type of immigrants may often change over the course of time. The
incorporation of such factors could strongly affect our results. For
example, if we would assume a single burst of immigration rather
than a constant rate, immigrant culture would equilibrate at lower
levels or even go extinct (of course depending on the speciﬁc
assumptions about payoffs associated with both traits).
Our model assumes that acculturation orientations are ﬁxed,
and cannot change over time. In reality, increasing migration
rates (and resulting large immigrant communities) can lead to
increases in negative attitudes towards migrants among the
resident population30. If this results in changing acculturation
orientations, this can have a signiﬁcant impact on the dynamics
of cultural change. In similar vein, mismatches may occur
between immigrant acculturation orientations and resident
acculturation expectations (i.e., how residents or the society as a
whole would prefer the immigrants to act)3,31. The interactive
acculturation model32 predicts that such mismatches can have a
signiﬁcant impact on the process of acculturation and can result
in conﬂicts. Our modelling framework lends itself well for
studying the consequences of changing acculturation orientations
and mismatching acculturation orientations and expectations.
Indeed, allowing for conditionally changing acculturation orien-
tations (e.g., as a function of the frequency of the immigrant trait
or the migration rate) provides one of the most promising
extensions of our current model. Longitudinal studies of accul-
turation orientations and expectations would be an ideal way to
provide an empirical basis for such models.
Methods
Speciﬁcation of interaction probabilities. The interaction probability X is
determined by the product of the interaction tendencies of both interaction part-
ners. If an individual of type I and an individual of type R are paired in an
interaction event, we calculate the interaction probability as:
Xir ¼ xir  xri: ð10Þ
Similarly, the interaction probability between two individuals of the same type is
calculated as Xii ¼ xii  xii for type I, and Xrr ¼ xrr  xrr for type R.
Only interactions between individuals with different cultural traits can result in
a change in the cultural trait of the focal individual. Whether this happens depends
on the focal individual’s changing probability S, which is a function of its cultural
conservatism and its social learning strategy (see below).
Speciﬁcation of changing probabilities. We allow for the possibility that in case
of an interaction, one of the traits is more easily transmitted than the other. To
model this, we ascribe ‘payoffs’ Wr and Wi to the traits and assume that the ease of
transmission of a trait is related to the payoff difference between the traits (ΔW =
Wr −Wi). To be more speciﬁc, an individual will change its cultural trait with
changing probability S, which is the product of its willingness to change (deter-
mined by its cultural conservatism c) and its changing bias (determined by the
payoff difference ΔW). For type I individuals, this probability is given by:
Si ¼ ð1 ciÞ
|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
willingness to change
 2
1þ eΔW
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
changing bias
: ð11Þ
For type R individuals, it is given by:
Sr ¼ ð1 crÞ  21þ eΔW : ð12Þ
Following the standard way of modelling success-based learning in cultural evo-
lutionary theory (e.g., ref. 33), we model the changing bias as an increasing S-
shaped function of the difference between the own payoff and the payoff of the
other type, with the magnitude of the difference between the payoffs ΔW deter-
mining the slope of the function. We denote the difference between changing
probabilities of type R and type I as ΔS = Sr − Si. The factor 2 in the changing bias
ensures that S simply reduces to 1−c if both cultural traits have equal payoffs (i.e., if
Wr =Wi); if this is the case, ΔS = ci−cr = −Δc.
Payoff consequences. We consider four scenarios in which the two cultural traits
have payoff consequences, affecting their transmission probabilities to other
individuals through success-based learning. In the ﬁrst two scenarios, ‘resident
advantage’ and ‘immigrant advantage’, we assume that payoffs Wr and Wi are
constant, but one is larger than the other (the superior payoff is set to W0> 0, and
the inferior payoff is set to 0). In the next two scenarios, we assume that the payoff
associated with a cultural trait is dependent on its perceived frequency in the
population. In the ‘coordination’ (or conformism) scenario, individuals are more
likely to adopt a cultural trait if they perceive its frequency to be higher (i.e., the
payoff of a cultural trait increases with its perceived frequency). Conversely, in the
‘complementation’ scenario, payoff decreases with perceived frequency.
We assume that individuals do not know the exact population constitution, but
perceive the frequencies of the cultural traits to be equal to the frequencies with
which they encounter them in interactions. We denote perceived frequency as pxjy
(the perceived frequency of type X, from the point of view of type Y), and calculate
it as:
pxjy ¼
px  Xxy
px  Xxy þ ð1 pxÞ  Xyy : ð13Þ
This is simply the conditional probability that the focal individual interacts with an
individual of type X, given that it is of type Y. The payoffs in the coordination and
the complementation scenarios are directly proportional to the perceived
frequencies: in the coordination scenario, Wr =W0.pr|r and Wi =W0.pi|i; in the
complementation scenario, Wr =W0.pi|r and Wi =W0.pr|i.
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Individual-based simulation parameters. In the individual-based model,
migration, interaction and social learning were implemented exactly as described
for the analytical model. We use this model to verify if our analytical results for the
baseline model still hold in a ﬁnite population in which stochasticity plays an
important role. We simulated a population of size 1000 individuals, systematically
varying the migration rate m (ranging between 0.001 and 0.1 with step size 0.005),
parameters ci and cr (ranging between 0.001 and 1.0 with step size 0.05), and Xir
(for values 0.1 and 0.5). For each of the resulting parameter combinations, we ran
10 replicate simulations of 106 events.
Code availability. The simulation code used in this study has been made available
at GitHub (https://github.com/yagmurerten/migration2017).
Data availability. The mathematical models, data generated by the simulations
and the processing script are deposited in ﬁgshare with the identiﬁer (https://doi.
org/10.6084/m9.ﬁgshare.4748269).
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